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EXEMPTION 7(D) OF THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT-THE
EVIDENTIARY SHOWING THE
GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE TO
ESTABLISH THAT A SOURCE
IS CONFIDENTIAL
United States Department of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct.
2014 (1993)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States Department of Justice v. Landano,I the Supreme
Court held that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sources in
criminal investigations are not presumed to be "confidential
sources" pursuant to Exemption 7(D) of the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act (FOIA).2 The Court established two factors in determining
whether or not a particular source is presumed confidential: (1) the
nature of the crime and (2) the source's relation to the crime. 3 If
these considerations support an inference that the source gave in-
formation in confidence, then the source qualifies as a confidential
source.
4
This Note examines the Court's treatment in Landano of the
tension between the broad disclosure of FOIA and the broad pro-
tection from disclosure of Exemption 7(D): This Note contends that
the Court properly interpreted the statute as it currently exists.
However, this Note suggests that a rebuttable presumption of confi-
dentiality for FBI sources in criminal investigations would better
serve Exemption 7(D)'s purpose of effective law enforcement with-
out compromising FOIA's purpose of public scrutiny. Thus, this
Note argues that Congress should amend Exemption 7(D) of FOIA
to provide a presumption of confidentiality.
1 113 S. Ct. 2014 (1993).
2 Id.
3 kd at 2023-24.
4 Id. at 2024.
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II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1966, Congress enacted FOIA to protect "the public's right
to know the operations of its Government" by "establish[ing] a gen-
eral philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is ex-
empted under clearly delineated statutory language."5 Eager to
strengthen this philosophy of full disclosure, Congress amended the
statute in 1974.6 The amendment required that the Government
"specify some harm in order to claim the exemption" instead of "af-
fording all law enforcement matters a blanket exemption." 7 Con-
gress intended "to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the
functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corrup-
tion and to hold the governors accountable to the governed.",,
Congress expressly limited the disclosure by delineating ex-
emptions, but did not intend them to detract from FOIA's policy of
public disclosure.9 Thus, exemptions generally are construed nar-
rowly.10 Nonetheless, the public's interest extends only to informa-
tion that exposes the government's performance of its duties, I and
the exemptions are intended to have meaningful reach and applica-
5 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 8, 3 (1965); see Cox v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1304 (8th Cir. 1978).
6 Irons v. FBI, 880 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (1st Cir. 1989); see H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974) (noting that "this bill seeks to reach the goal of more efficient,
prompt, and full disclosure of information"); see also Cox, 576 F.2d at 1304.
7 120 CONG. REC. 36,626 (1974) (statement of Rep. Reid); see FBI v. Abramson, 456
U.S. 615, 627 (1982).
8 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978); see also S. REP. No.
813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965) ("A government by secrecy benefits no one. It
injures the people it seeks to serve; it injures its own integrity and operation. It breeds
mistrust, dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty."); Department of
Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 372 (1976) (finding that the basic purpose of FOIA was
"to open agency action to the light of public scrutiny"); Hale v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 898 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that the purpose is to ensure that the
public can scrutinize the government's performance and thereby promote governmental
honesty).
9 See John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151 (1989) (noting that
"these limited exemptions do not obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is
the dominant objective of the Act") (quoting Rose, 425 U.S. at 361).
10 See, e.g., Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; Parton v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 727 F.2d
774, 776 (8th Cir. 1984) (finding that "exemptions are to be narrowly construed in ac-
cordance with the legislative purpose of Congress that disclosure rather than secrecy is
the dominant objective of FOIA").
I1 Hale, 973 F.2d at 898; see United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774 (1989) (finding that "FOIA's central purpose is
to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny,
not that information about private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the
Government [but that reveals little or nothing about the agency's own conduct] be so
disclosed").
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tion. 12 Furthermore, since FOIA was not intended as a supplement
for discovery,13 litigants (such as Landano) merely have the same
right to information as the rest of the public; their claim cannot be
enhanced by their predicament.14
Despite the narrow construction of the exemptions, when Con-
gress first enacted FOIA, Exemption 7 broadly protected all law en-
forcement investigatory files. 15 Congress recognized that "it is also
necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow it to
keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of
the [FBI]."' 16 While Congress wanted to strengthen disclosure in
1974, it simultaneously wanted to enact a broad exemption for law
enforcement. 17 Consequently, it created Exemption 7(D), which,
according to Senator Hart (who authored and proposed the exemp-
tion), allowed the FBI "not only [to] withhold information which
would disclose the identity of a confidential source but also [to] pro-
vide blanket protection for any information supplied by a confiden-
tial source. . . . [A]ll the FBI has to do is to state that the
information was furnished by a confidential source and it is ex-
empt."' 8 Additionally, in 1986 Congress amended FOIA and fur-
ther broadened Exemption 7(D).' 9 The exemption now protects a
12 John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152; Nadler v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 955 F.2d
1479, 1485 (11 th Cir. 1992).
13 See, e.g.,John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153 (finding that FOIA was not intended to
supplement or displace rules of discovery); Baldridge v. Shapiro, 445 U.S. 345, 360 n.
14 (1982).
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 n. 23 (1978); Nix
v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1978).
Since FOIA attempts to allow public scrutiny, all citizens-including a historian do-
ing research and a criminal defendant formulating a defense-have equal access to in-
formation. Irons v. FBI, 880 F.2d 1446, 1456 (1st Cir. 1989). It is not the responsibility
of law enforcement agencies to compile information for the defense.
15 United State Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1993) (quoting
FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982)).
16 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965); see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 n.
6 (1973); see also 120 CONG. REC. 17,040 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart) (stating that
"Exemption 7(D) would not hinder the Bureau's [ability to gather information] in any
way").
17 Irons, 880 F.2d at 1451-52. The Irons court found that the 1974 amendment
sought to enact a broad exemption to protect the source and the flow of information to
law enforcement agencies. Id. at 1449. This court also found that in the 1986 amend-
ment Congress sought to broaden the reach of 7(D) and to considerably ease the
agency's burden in invoking it. Id- at 1451-52.
18 120 CONG. REC. S6871 (1974) (statement of Sen. Hart); see Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d
623, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1981).
19 Irons, 880 F.2d at 1452. The revision expanded "records" to "records or informa-
tion," replaced the word "would" with the phrase "could reasonably be expected to,"
deleted the word "only" from before "confidential source," and clarified that a confi-
dential source could be a state, local, or foreign agency or a private institution. Id. at
1451.
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wide range of information.
[Exemption 7(D) protects] records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of
such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a
state, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution
which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of
a record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement au-
thority in the course of a criminal investigation ... information fur-
nished by a confidential source.20
Thus, the broad protection of Exemption 7(D) undermines FOIA's
general philosophy of broad disclosure with narrowly construed
exemptions.
FOIA explicitly places the burden of proving that exemptions
apply on the Government. 21 Exemption 7(D)'s application depends
not upon the nature of the information itself, but upon whether the
information was furnished by a confidential source.22 The Confer-
ence Report of the 1974 Amendment determined that a source was
confidential if it "provided information under an express assurance
of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance
could be reasonably inferred." 23 Since determining whether an
agent gave an express assurance is usually straightforward, disputes
usually arise over whether an assurance may be inferred from the cir-
cumstances. Ultimately, Congress sought "to reach a workable bal-
ance between the right of the public to know and the need of the
Government to keep information in confidence." 24 Given this legis-
lative history, it was left up to the courts to determine exactly how
the Government could satisfy its burden of proof to invoke Exemp-
tion 7(D).
B. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND
The circuit courts took two approaches in determining what the
Government must prove to withhold information under Exemption
20 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1986).
21 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1986).
22 United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1993); Dow
Jones & Co. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 917 F.2d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir 1990) (finding
that Exemption 7 does not depend on the factual content of the requested document,
but rather upon whether the source was confidential).
23 S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6267, 6291; see Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2019-20.
24 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2418, 2423; see John Doe Agency v.John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989); see also S.
REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) (stating that "[s]uccess lies in providing a
workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests, yet places
emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure").
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7(D). Some circuits placed a significant burden upon the Govern-
ment and required it to prove that the circumstances could indeed
support an inference of an assurance of confidentiality.2 5 Other cir-
cuits placed a considerably more lenient burden on the Govern-
ment, recognizing that assurances of confidentiality are "inherently
implicit" during Government investigations. 26
1. The First Approach: The Government Bears a Significant Burden
The first approach, and all its variations, emphasized the fact
that FOIA placed the burden of proof on the Government, not the
"requester. ' 27 In an early case, Vaughn v. Rosen,28 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia found that the requester typically
does not have any knowledge of the information being withheld,
and thus could not effectively contest the decision. 29 To preserve
fairness and the benefits of the adversarial system, the court devel-
oped the "Vaughn Index," which required the Government to pres-
ent a detailed justification for withholding information and to
specify which exemption it was employing for each portion of a doc-
ument it chose to withhold. 30 The court recognized that the burden
on the Government was substantial, but found that the alternative-
allowing the Government to utilize an exemption by merely assert-
ing it applied-essentially shifted the burden to the requester.3'
This shift, the court held, was inconsistent with the statutory man-
date of placing the burden on the agency seeking to avoid disclo-
sure.32 While subsequent D.C. Circuit decisions have strayed from
this approach,3 3 Vaughn laid the foundation for those circuits that
placed a significant burden on the Government.
25 See infra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
27 The "requester" refers to the person who, under FOIA, requests access to infor-
mation contained by the Government.
28 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
29 1&t at 823-24 (noting that since it would be extremely difficult to oppose the Gov-
ernment's decision, this would allow for abuses of the exemptions); see also infra notes
68-69 and accompanying text for the proposition that this lack of information leads to a
practically irrefutable presumption against disclosure.
30 Id. at 826-27. The court reasoned that this information would provide a requester
with sufficient knowledge to contest the Government's use of an exemption. Id- at 828.
Further, it found that "an analysis sufficiently detailed would not have to contain factual
descriptions that if made public would compromise the secret nature of the informa-
tion." Id. at 826. Assuming this to be true, producing this information would not defeat
the exemption (by informing the requester of the information the Government is at-
tempting to withhold) while trying to determine whether it applies.
31 Id- at 828.
32 Id.
33 See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit utilized a slight variation of this approach.
As in Vaughn, the Ninth Circuit focused on providing the requester
with the opportunity to effectively contest the use of the exemption,
thereby utilizing the adversarial system.34 In Wiener v. FBI,35 Profes-
sor Wiener requested access to all FBI records pertaining to John
Lennon for academic research.3 6 The Ninth Circuit found that in
addition to the circumstances supporting an inference of an assur-
ance of confidentiality, they must also support an inference that the
FBI concluded that the source would not have cooperated absent
such an assurance.3 7 Since the FBI did not describe the circum-
stances with particularity, the court held that the Bureau failed to
meet its burden. 38
The Second Circuit's variation, its "functional approach," re-
quired both that the source would not have revealed the informa-
tion and that the lack of information would have hindered the
investigation.3 9 In Donovan v. FBI,40 the families of four American
churchwomen who were murdered in El Salvador requested access
to all government documents pertaining to the FBI's investigation
of the murders.41 The Second Circuit determined that "an implicit
promise of confidentiality may be found when 'it is apparent that the
agency's investigatory function depends for its existence upon infor-
mation supplied by individuals who in many cases would suffer se-
vere detriment if their identities were known.' -42 The court held
that the agency satisfied its burden because the FBI's investigation
would have been severely curtailed if its sources had feared
disclosure.43
Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' varia-
tion did not emphasize the importance of effective advocacy. 44 In
Nix v. United States,45 plaintiff sought records of an investigation
34 See Wiener v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972, 977, 987 (9th Cir. 1991).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 976-77.
37 Id. at 987 (holding that the FBI "must state the circumstances surrounding the
receipt of information which led the FBI to conclude that the informant would not have
given the information without an implicit assurance of confidentiality").
38 Id.
39 See Donovan v. FBI, 806 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1986); Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir. 1983).
40 806 F.2d at 55.
41 Id. at 57.
42 Id. at 61 (quoting Diamond, 707 F.2d at 78).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., Nix v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 572 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1978);
Parton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 727 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1984).
45 572 F.2d 998.
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based on his complaint of an assault while he was in prison.46 The
Fourth Circuit found that the agency had "to show that the informa-
tion was furnished under circumstances from which an assurance of
confidentiality could reasonably be inferred."'47 The Government
met its burden by proving that the information was provided from a
prison setting with the threat of violent reprisals. 48 The court held
that these circumstances supported the inference of an assurance of
confidentiality. 49 This variation, along with all the other variations,
followed-the express language of the statute by placing the burden
on the Government to convince the court that information was fur-
nished under circumstances from which an assurance of confidenti-
ality could reasonably be inferred.
2. The Second Approach: The Government Does Not Bear
a Significant Burden
The majority of the circuits took the second approach and
placed a considerably more lenient burden on the Government. 50
The Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits all considered
promises of confidentiality to be "inherently implicit" in FBI inter-
views.5 1 In Miller v. Bell,52 the plaintiff requested access to records
pertaining to his complaint that someone wiretapped his tele-
phone.53 The Seventh Circuit found that "unless there is evidence
to the contrary .... promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit
in FBI interviews conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation." 54
Consequently, the FBI merely had to prove that it interviewed the
sources in a criminal investigation. Predictably, the court held that
all the sources were confidential except for a woman who expressly
46 Id at 1000-01.
47 Id at 1003 (emphasis added); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
48 Nix, 998 F.2d at 1003.
49 id at 1004.
50 While the Second, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits placed a significant burden
on the Government (see supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text), the Third, Sixth,
Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits have prescribed a more leni-
ent burden in a larger number of cases. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text; see
also infra notes 56 and 72 (for clarification of the D.C. and the Third Circuits' respective
positions).
51 See, e.g., Ingle v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983);
Brant Construction Co. v. EPA, 778 F.2d 1258, 1263 (7th Cir. 1985); Hale v. United
States Dep't ofJustice, 973 F.2d 894, 899 (10th Cir. 1992); Nadler v. United States Dep't
ofJustice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (lth Cir. 1992).
52 661 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1981) (the first case to utilize the "inherently implicit"
approach).
53 Id at 625.
54 Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
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waived her confidential status. 55
The D.C. Circuit's variation of this approach expressly provided
the Government with a presumption that sources who cooperated dur-
ing a criminal investigation did so with assurances of confidential-
ity.5 6 In Dow Jones & Co. v. United States Department ofJustice,57 plaintiff
attempted to obtain access to a letter to the House Ethics Commit-
tee that summarized the results of ajustice Department's probe into
possible wrongdoings of a Congressman. 58 Even though the D.C.
Circuit remarked that the burden was on the Government, the court
protected the letter from disclosure.5 9 The court concluded that,
since promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit when the
FBI solicits information (as long as it was solicited during a law en-
forcement investigation), the FBI had the presumption that such as-
surances were given.60 The court readily admitted that in practical
terms this presumption was essentially irrefutable. 6 1 Nevertheless,
the D.C. Circuit denied a rehearing because it found that "at least
some element of confidentiality [was] virtually always present" in
FBI interviews, and that this "element of confidentiality . . . satis-
fie[d] the 'confidential source' standard."'62
The D.C. Circuit struggled with the tension between this pre-
sumption and the statutory language of FOIA.63 In his concurring
opinion, Judge Edwards felt constrained by an earlier case, but still
highlighted two discrepancies between the majority's ruling and the
language of FOIA.64 First, since Exemption 7(D) applies to sources
who cooperate during a criminal investigation only if they are confi-
dential, the concurring opinion suggested that Congress anticipated
that some sources may not be confidential. 65 Thus, the word "confi-
55 Id. at 628.
56 Parker v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 934 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The
D.C. Circuit still required the Government to satisfy the Vaughn Index by justifying why,
and under which exemption, the information was withheld. See supra note 30 and accom-
panying text. However, this burden became a matter of procedure prior to adjudication,
and it could typically be satisfied with categorical justifications. The D.C. Circuit then
adopted the "inherently implicit" approach in adjudication, and this approach recently
developed into a presumption against disclosure for criminal investigative sources. See
Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
57 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc, 917 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
58 Id. at 572.
59 Id. at 576-77.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 577.
62 Id. at 579 (Silberman, J., concurring in decision to deny rehearing).
63 See id. at 577-78 (Edwards, J., concurring).
64 Id. at 577 (Edwards, J., concurring) (citing Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 337
(D.C. Cir. 1990)).
65 See id. (Edwards, J., concurring).
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dential" was meant as a limitation on the application of 7(D).66
Consequently, the majority's invention of a presumption that all
criminal investigative sources are confidential simply voids Con-
gress' express limitation. 67 Second, the presumption of confidenti-
ality shifted the burden of proof to the requester who has essentially
no knowledge of the withheld material.68 Thus, the requester would
be unable to refute the presumption.69 This shift contradicts the
express mandate of FOIA, which places the burden of proof to in-
voke the exemption on the Government.70 As the dissent in the de-
nial of a rehearing en banc stated, "a burden that is presumed
satisfied is, of course, no burden at all."'71
The Third Circuit's variation, consistent with the D.C. Circuit's
approach, merely allowed the Government to assert that the exemp-
tion applied. 72 In Conoco Inc. v. United States Department of Justice,73
the plaintiff attempted to obtain access to records of an investiga-
tion of a scheme by some of the plaintiff's employees to circumvent
petroleum price controls.7 4 The court found that the Government
simply had to "identify the document and state that the information
was furnished by a confidential source. To require more detail than
this would greatly increase the possibility that the source and con-
tent of the confidential correspondence [would] be revealed." 75
Not surprisingly, the court held that the Government satisfied this
"burden," and the documents were exempt. 76
Given the legislative history and the dichotomy between the cir-
cuits, the United States Supreme Court had to decide what the Gov-
66 IL (Edwards, J., concurring).
67 Id. at 580 (Edwards, J., dissenting from decision to deny rehearing).
68 Id. at 578 (Edwards, J., concurring).
69 Id- (Edwards, J., concurring). Since the requester had no knowledge of the with-
held information, it would be almost impossible for the requester to develop an argu-
ment to overcome the presumption. Thus, such a presumption would be essentially
irrefutable. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
70 Id. at 580 (Edwards, J., dissenting from decision to deny rehearing).
71 Id (Edwards, J., dissenting from decision to deny rehearing).
72 See Conoco Inc. v. United States Dep't of'Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982).
A year earlier, the Third Circuit required that it be provided with detailed explanations
relating to each alleged confidential source. See Lame v. United States Dep't ofJustice,
654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981). The Conoco case does not mention the Lame case, and
to complicate matters, the Circuit later reverted back to the Lame standard without men-
tioning Conoco. See Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.
1992) (the court considered itself bound by Lame); see also infra notes 99-100.
73 687 F.2d at 724.
74 Id. at 726.




emnment had to do to satisfy its burden of proving that its source
was confidential.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 13, 1976, two gunmen robbed the Hi-Way Check
Cashing Service in Kearney, New Jersey. 77 One of the gunmen shot
& killed a police officer. 78 Respondent Vincent Landano was con-
victed in a New Jersey state court of murdering Newark Police Of-
ficer John Snow in the course of the robbery.79 Evidence at trial
indicated that the robbery was orchestrated by Victor Forni and a
motorcycle gang known as "the Breed."8 0 Moreover, testimony at
trial indicated that the Breed recruited Landano for the robbery.8 '
Landano maintained his innocence and claimed that Forni was the
man who killed Officer Snow.8 2 Landano attempted to obtain state
post-conviction and federal habeas relief, but both efforts were
unsuccessful.83
While pursuing a claim in state courts that the prosecution
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,s4
Landano filed FOIA requests with the FBI to support his cause of
action. Landano sought disclosure of all information the Bureau
had compiled in its investigation of Officer Snow's murder, as well
as the files it had on Forni.8 5 The FBI released several hundred
77 Landano v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 956 F.2d 422, 425 (3d Cir. 1992).
78 Id.




83 See State v. Landano, 483 A.2d 153 (N.J. 1984) (appeal denied); Landano v. Raf-
ferty, 670 F. Supp. 570 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding that a witness's recantation of testimony
that he saw Landano driving the get-away car was not credible), aff'd, 856 F.2d 569 (3d
Cir. 1988) (holding that the trial court's finding was binding, even though the circuit
court was convinced the recantation was believable), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1014 (1989);
Landano v. Rafferty, 126 F.R.D. 627 (D.NJ. 1989) (issuing a conditional writ of habeas
corpus), rev'd, 897 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Landano had not exhausted his
state law remedies), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 811 (1990).
84 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused violates due process where evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.
Id. at 87.
85 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2017. Initially there was an issue of whether Landano could
get Forni's file, but then Forni gave his consent. Landano v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 751 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.N.J. 1990). The only remaining issue was how much of
the file the FBI was required to disclose. See id. Since this was the same issue concerning
Landano's other request, they were all handled together. Id.
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pages, some which were redacted, and withheld several hundred
others.8 6 Landano filed an action in the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey seeking complete disclosure of all the
files that he requested.8 7 Then the Government submitted the
declaration of FBI Special Agent Regina Superneau, which ex-
plained the Bureau's reasons for withholding portions of the files.8 8
Next, both Landano and the Government moved for summary
judgment.8 9
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court
rejected the Government's categorical claim that all sources of crim-
inal investigations deserve confidential status.90 The district court
held that the Government must provide specific reasons why each
particular source qualified as a "confidential source." 91 Evidently,
the court was willing to assume that the FBI informants were confi-
dential sources, but it held that the FBI had to articulate "case spe-
cific reasons for non-disclosure" of all other information withheld
under Exemption 7(D).92 It concluded that the Government had
not met its burden of establishing that each withheld document rea-
sonably could be expected to disclose the identity of, or information
provided by, a "confidential source." 93
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this por-
tion of the decision. 94 The court relied on legislative history, and
declared that if the source received an explicit assurance of confi-
dentiality, or if there are circumstances from which an assurance
could reasonably be inferred, then that source is confidential within
the meaning of Exemption 7(D). 95 The court found that an "assur-
ance of confidentiality" is not a promise of complete anonymity, but
rather an assurance that the FBI would not disclose the information
86 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2017.
87 Id. at 2018.
88 Id.
89 1d,
90 See Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 751 F. Supp. 502 (D.NJ. 1990),
clarified on reconsideration, 758 F. Supp. 1021 (D.NJ. 1991).
91 Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 508.
92 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2018 (referring to Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 508).
93 Id. (citing Landano, 751 F. Supp. at 508). Exemption 7(D) protects both the iden-
tity and information provided by confidential sources. See supra note 20 and accompany-
ing text.
94 Landano v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 956 F.2d 422, 435 (3d Cir. 1992).
95 Id, at 433 (quoting S. REP. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6291).
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except to further the "success of its law enforcement objective."'9 6
The court of appeals then turned to the Government's categorical
claim that whenever any individual or institutional source supplies
information to the FBI during a criminal investigation, they should
be presumed confidential.9 7 The court recognized that other cir-
cuits supported the Government's claim;98 however, the court found
that it had previously decided this issue.9 9 Since there had been no
intervening decisions by the Supreme Court requiring a departure
from precedent, the court considered itself bound.100 The court of
appeals determined that the Government must provide "detailed
explanations relating to each alleged confidential source" in order
to justify withholding the information under Exemption 7(D). 10 1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 02 to re-
solve the circuit split over the Government's evidentiary burden
under Exemption 7(D).103 The Court focused on "whether the
Government is entitled to a presumption that all sources supplying
information to the [FBI] in the course of a criminal investigation are
confidential sources."' 04
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION
The United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion
written by Justice O'Connor, concluded that not all of the FBI's
criminal investigative sources should automatically be presumed
confidential.105 The Court determined that if the nature of the
crime investigated and the source's relation to it support the infer-
ence of confidentiality, the Government is entitled to this presump-
tion.106 Since the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided it
could not rely on these circumstances, its decision was vacated, and
96 Id. at 434.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 432-33; see supra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
99 Landano, 956 F.2d at 434 (referring to Lame v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 654
F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that the "court, in order to find that assurances [of
confidentiality], express or implied, were given, had to be furnished with detailed expla-
nations relating to each alleged confidential source")).
100 Id. (the court apparently overlooked Conoco Inc. v. United States Dep't ofJustice,
687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982) (see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text) or im-
plicitly found that the situation was not analogous).
101 Id. at 435 (quoting Lame v. United States, 654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981)).
102 United States Dep't ofJustice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 51 (1992).
103 United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2019 (1993).
104 Id. at 2017.
105 Id. at 2024.
106 Id.
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the case was remanded for further proceedings.10 7
The Court focused on the Government's burden of establishing
that a source is "confidential" within the meaning of Exemption
7(D).108 After recognizing that the Government must prove that the
exemption applies, the Court declared that 7(D) does not focus on
the type of information given, but rather on whether that informa-
tion was given with an understanding that it would remain confiden-
tial.' 0 9 In this case, the Government did not attempt to prove that
the FBI made explicit promises of confidentiality to particular
sources. 1 0 The Court recognized that such proof apparently is not
possible because "It]he FBI does not have a policy of discussing
confidentiality with every source, and when such discussions do oc-
cur, agents do not always document them.""' Thus, "the precise
question before [the Court] ... is how the Government can meet its
burden of showing that a source provided information on an im-
plied assurance of confidentiality. ' 12
In order to preserve some meaning in Exemption 7(D), the
Court agreed with the Third Circuit and rejected Landano's conten-
tion that the exemption was limited to sources who were assured-
explicitly or implicitly--of complete anonymity. 113 At the time of
the interview, neither the source nor the interviewer ordinarily
knows whether the information will need to be disclosed (for exam-
ple, to other officers, other agencies, or at trial) ." 4 Affirming
Landano's claim would limit the exemption so much that, practically
speaking, it would have no effect. 11 5 Thus, the Court held that
" 'confidential,' as used in Exemption 7(D), refers to a degree of
confidentiality less than total secrecy."116
The Court rejected the Government's contention that assur-
ances of confidentiality are "inherently implicit" whenever a source
cooperates with the FBI in a criminal investigation, because this rule
107 Id.
108 See id. at 2020.
109 Id. at 2019; see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
110 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2020.
111 Id.
112 Id. Since the Court concluded that it was not possible to prove express assurances
of confidentiality, it focused on implied assurances. Id
113 Id. See supra note 96 and accompanying text for the Third Circuit holding.
114 See Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2020.
115 Id- (citingJohn Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (FOIA
exemptions "are intended to have meaningful reach and application")).
116 Id. (holding that under Exemption 7(D), "a source should be deemed confidential
if the source furnished information with the understanding that the FBI would not di-




would essentially exempt all FBI sources.' 17 While the Court has
used a categorical approach with another exemption,' 18 at least with
respect to FBI sources, this approach would in effect be universal-
not categorical.1 19 This approach does not comport with "common
sense and probability" because the FBI gets all types of information
from all types of sources, and it is highly improbable that all of them
should be presumed confidential.' 20 The Court found that such an
approach would be unfair because the requester, who has no knowl-
edge about the particular source or the information being withheld,
very rarely will be in a position to offer persuasive evidence that the
source should not be confidential. 12 1 In essence, this would be an
irrefutable presumption. 122 Finally, since FOIA placed the burden
of proof on the Government, and the Government offered no per-
suasive evidence that Congress intended the Bureau to be able to
satisfy its burden by simply asserting that a source communicated
with the FBI during a criminal investigation, the Court found this
approach to be inconsistent with the imposed burden of proof and
congressional intent.' 23
The unanimous Court established considerations to help deter-
mine whether or not the source should be presumed confidential. 124
If the character of the crime at issue and the source's relation to the
crime "support an inference of confidentiality, the Government is
entitled to a presumption."'' 2 5 The Court asserted that this more
117 See id. at 2021 (implying that most if not all of the FBI's sources provide informa-
tion during a criminal investigation).
118 See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989) (holding that under Exemption 7(C) the category of criminal "rap
sheet" information was categorically exempt).
119 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2021 (implicitly finding that the Government's category of
all sources that cooperate during a criminal investigation encompasses all FBI's sources,
and thus is not truly a subsection or category, but rather a totality or universal
approach).
120 Id. (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988)). The Court recog-
nized that confidentiality is important for law enforcement, but held that the presump-
tion could not apply to either individual or institutional sources. Id. First, reprisals
against individual sources are aberrant, and the Government offered no explanation
other than administrative ease for presuming their confidentiality. Id. Second, the
Court found no argument that, absent the presumption, other law enforcement agencies
would be deterred from disclosing information. Id. at 2022. Again, with institutional
sources, the Court concluded that to say that private institutions may be subject to legal
action is merely conclusory.
121 Id. (citing DowJones & Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 917 F.2d 571, 577
(D.C. Cir 1990)); see supra note 69 and accompanying text.
122 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022.
123 Id. at 2022-23.
124 See id. at 2023-24.
125 Id. at 2024. The Court also listed other cases which have implicitly taken these
factors into account. Id. at 2023 (citing Keyes v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d
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particularized approach is consistent with Congress' intent to pro-
vide "workable rules" of FOIA disclosure. 126 The justices deter-
mined that the test seemed feasible because it is generally possible
to establish these factors.1 27 Furthermore, the Court determined
that the test was fair because, knowing these factors, the requester
will have a more realistic opportunity to contend that 7(D) should
not apply.' 28
Despite recognizing some merits in the proposed "prophylactic
rule protecting the identities of all FBI criminal investigative
sources," the Court refused to interpret the statute as including a
blanket exemption. 129 The Court concluded that this ruling was
consistent with the Court's obligation to construe FOIA exemptions
narrowly in favor of disclosure. i30
V. ANALYSIS
This Note contends that the Landano Court correctly denied the
presumption of confidentiality because it would be inconsistent with
the statutory construction. Moreover, this Note critiques the con-
siderations established by the Court and concludes that, while they
fail to provide concrete guidance to the Government and lower
courts, they do help narrow the relevant considerations. Further-
more, taking into consideration the purpose of FOIA and Exemp-
tion 7(D) from a policy perspective, this Note argues that criminal
investigative sources should be presumed confidential. However,
the Government should be generally required to inform the re-
quester of the circumstances under which the information was ob-
tained. Essentially, Congress should amend FOIA, or specifically
Exemption 7(D), to allow for a rebuttable presumption.
337, 345-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Donovan v. FBI, 806 F.2d 55, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1986); Par-
ton v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 727 F.2d 774, 776-77 (8th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Bell,
661 F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1981); Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003-04 (4th Cir.
1978)).
126 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023-24 (citing Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press,
489 U.S. 749, 779 (1989) (quoting FTC v. Grolier Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 27 (1983))); see supra
note 24 and accompanying text.
127 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2024.
128 Id. (finding that, to the extent that the Government's proof of these factors may
compromise legitimate interests (such as practically exposing the source before its status
is determined), the Government can still attempt to meet its burden with in camera
affidavits).
129 Id (recognizing that the proposed rule would both serve the Government's law
enforcement interest and be easy for the FBI and the courts to implement).
130 Id (citingJohn Doe Agency v.John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989)); see supra
notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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A. THE STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROHIBITS THE PRESUMPTION
Landano alludes to two reasons why a presumption of confiden-
tiality would be inconsistent with the construction of FOIA and Ex-
emption 7(D). First, as Landano found, a presumption would, in
effect, negate FOIA's explicit provision for placing the burden of
proof on the agency.1 31 Second, a presumption would moot the
meaning of the word "confidential" in the phrase "confidential
source," thereby negating its limiting purpose.
The Landano Court correctly held that the Government had the
burden of proving Exemption 7(D) applies and that the FBI cannot
satisfy its burden merely by asserting that its source cooperated dur-
ing a criminal investigation. 13 2 Allowing the burden to be satisfied
by such an assertion effectively shifts the burden of proof to the re-
quester.133 Since the statute explicitly places the burden on the
Government, 34 the Court should not place the burden on the re-
quester to come forth with evidence to rebut a presumption. 35
The Government may respond in two ways, neither of which
will refute the inconsistency. First, the FBI may contend that the
presumption would not shift the burden of proof because the Bu-
reau still must establish that the source furnished information dur-
ing a criminal investigation. However, empirically this burden has
been satisfied by the Government's mere assertions that it was true,
because the requester lacked the knowledge to contend such asser-
tions.' 36 Thus, there is actually no burden affirmatively to prove
anything. Second, the FBI may contend that the presumption
would not shift the burden per se, but rather decrease the quantum
of proof needed to satisfy it.137 Nevertheless, once the quantum be-
comes zero (meaning that there is nothing affirmatively to prove-one
can merely assert facts), the burden ceases to exist. "A burden pre-
sumed satisfied is, of course, no burden at all."' 138 As the Court ob-
served in Landano, it is not logical that Congress intended the
131 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023.
132 See id. at 2022-23; see also supra notes 21, 68-71 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
134 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
135 See DowJones & Co. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 917 F.2d 571, 577 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (Edwards, J., concurring) (criticizing Schmerler v. FBI, 900 F.2d 333, 337 (D.C.
Cir. 1990), for placing the burden on the FOIA requester).
136 See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text for examples of cases in which the
Government satisfied the burden with assertions.
137 Dow Jones, 917 F.2d 571 (D.C. Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en banc, 917 F.2d 578, 579
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (Silberman, J., concurring in decision to deny a rehearing).
138 Id. at 580 (Edwards, J., dissenting from decision to deny rehearing); see supra note
71 and accompanying text.
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Government to prevail on an Exemption 7(D) claim merely by as-
serting it.'1 9
The Landano Court implicitly observed that the presumption
would essentially moot any limitation on the type of FBI source that
qualified under Exemption 7(D).140 The Court found the Govern-
ment's contention defective because it was a universal-rather than
categorical-approach. 141 The Court meant that, at least with re-
gards to FBI sources, almost every source would be presumed confi-
dential. 42 Furthermore, the Court found that this presumption
would practically be irrefutable. 143 Thus, this approach moots the
meaning of the word "confidential" in the exemption because it as-
sumes away the issue of whether or not the particular FBI source is
confidential.
Examining the statutory construction can illustrate the Court's
position. Congress used the phrase "confidential source" to Clarify
that the identity of persons and institutions other than paid infor-
mants may be protected as long as they provided information under
express assurances of confidentiality or circumstances from which
such assurances could be inferred. 144 Nonetheless, the phrase is
still a limitation, because a source could be assured of confidentiality
and give information outside the context of a criminal investigation,
and because a criminal investigative source may not have received
an assurance-express or inferred--of confidentiality. Thus, "confi-
dential source" and "criminal investigative source" are not synony-
mous phrases. Since the FBI uses sources mainly for law
enforcement investigative purposes, to consider each such source a
"confidential source" practically makes the phrases synonymous.
139 See United States Dep't of Justice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2022-23 (1993)
(holding that if Congress meant to create such a rule, it could have done so much more
clearly).
140 Id. at 2021; see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text, which illustrate that the
phrase "confidential source" is supposed to be a limitation on the sources that qualify
under Exemption 7(D).
141 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2021.
142 Id.; see also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The FBI could contend that
there are other sources than those obtained during an investigation (e.g., agency direc-
tives, correspondence, and manuals) that would not be exempt. However, the other
sources would only allow the public to scrutinize how the agencies were supposed to be
fulfilling their duties, not how they are actually fulfilling their duties. The purpose of
FOIA is to allow for public scrutiny of agencies' actual conduct. See supra note I 1 and
accompanying text. Regardless, "confidential" would still be devoid of any unique
meaning.
143 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022; see also supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
144 See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Lesar v. United States Dep't of




Hence, such a presumption moots the meaning of the word "confi-
dential," along with any limiting effect that Congress intended.1 45
To avoid judicially shifting the burden that was legislatively
placed on the Government, and to avoid mooting a limitation within
Exemption 7(D), the Court correctly applied the language of the
statute and rejected this approach.
B. THE COURT'S CONSIDERATIONS
The Court established two considerations to help determine
when a source can be deemed confidential: (1) the character of the
crime, and (2) the source's relation to the crime.' 46 If these consid-
erations "support an inference of confidentiality, the Government is
entitled to a presumption."' 147
The Court's approach has a number of benefits. First, it is con-
sistent with the statutory language 48 and with the Court's obliga-
tion to construe FOIA's exemptions narrowly. 149 Next, it seems to
require common sense determinations, because it forces courts to
find that a source should be granted confidential status only when it
is reasonable to do so.150 Moreover, since the information concern-
ing these considerations is generally accessible to the Government,
the approach should be feasible. 15' Even if revealing this informa-
tion to a requester would reveal the source, this approach allows the
Government to attempt to invoke the exemption through in camera
review. 152 Finally, general knowledge of these considerations would
afford a requester the meaningful opportunity to contend the deter-
mination of confidentiality.153
There are also some difficulties, however, with using the
145 See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
146 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023-24; see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
147 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2024. Note that the Court employs an atypical use of the
term "presumption." Typically, presumptions do not require the party that obtains
them to do anything before they are invoked (e.g., the presumption of innocence does
not require the accused to prove anything before she is considered innocent). However,
under the Court's use of the word, the Government must establish facts (the nature of
the crime and the source's relation to it) and have ajudicial ruling on these facts in order
to invoke the presumption.
148 See supra notes 131-45 and accompanying text.
149 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2024; see supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
150 See Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023. The Court held that narrowly defined circum-
stances will support a presumption of confidentiality. Id. It gave the examples of an
informant and a witness to a gang-related murder, both of which reasonably should be
given confidential status and are granted such status under the Court's derivation. Id.
151 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
152 See supra note 128.
153 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 163-64 and accompa-
nying text.
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Court's considerations as a standard. First, it will be difficult for
lower courts and government agencies to apply. It is unclear
whether both the nature of the crime and the source's relation to it
must support an inference of confidentiality. It is also unclear
whether either consideration is afforded more weight than the
other. Furthermore, the Court did not suggest a resolution if only
one consideration supports an inference. Next, the considerations
are time-sensitive: for example, circumstances may not have sup-
ported an inference of confidentiality when a source divulged infor-
mation, but developments since then may clearly support such an
inference. The converse might also be true. The Court does not
deal with this temporal issue. Furthermore, aside from the extreme
cases obviously requiring confidentiality that the Court cites,' 54 the
considerations themselves are unclear and somewhat arbitrary.
What types of crimes and relations would indicate that it is reason-
able to infer confidentiality? The answer to this question is left to
judicial discretion. It is true that this may allow for flexibility in the
judicial system, but the considerations themselves provide little gui-
dance as to how they should be utilized. Thus, as is often the case,
the cost of the flexibility ofjudicial discretion is decreased uniform-
ity in judicial rulings.
Despite the difficulties of implementing the Landano Court's
standard, it at least narrows the relevant considerations. Prior to
Landano, the circuits that adopted similar reasoning and placed a
significant burden of proof on the Government simply forced the
agencies to prove that the circumstances reasonably could support
an inference of confidentiality.1 55 The Landano Court also required
this proof; however, instead of leaving it open ended, the Court at-
tempted to focus the inquiry on the two considerations it found to
be pertinent. 56 Thus, though the Government and the lower
courts may have difficulty applying the Court's standard, it at least
focuses the inquiry on the relevant considerations.
The easiest way for the FBI to circumvent the statutory lan-
guage would be to implement a policy that expressly assured each
criminal investigative source confidentiality at the initial interview.
The FBI already has a long-standing policy of treating as confiden-
tial all information obtained during the course of an investi-
gation.' 57 However, raising the issue may cause a source to
154 See supra note 150.
155 See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text.
156 See Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2023.
157 Nadler v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1992); see
also Londrigan v. FBI, 722 F.2d 840, 843-44 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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contemplate the risk of disclosure and chill a source who otherwise
might speak freely. 158 Thus, under the current statute, the FBI must
either risk this chilling effect, or risk disclosing their sources, which
may deter future sources from cooperating. 159
C. THE POLICY RATIONALE
There are two competing interests reflected in the Act. First,
FOIA seeks broad disclosure with narrow exemptions to provide the
public with a check consistent with the scheme of checks and bal-
ances. 160 Second, Exemption 7(D) seeks broad protection from dis-
closure to aid law enforcement. 16 1 Thus, in determining what
qualifies as a confidential source, one must balance the public's right
to know and the Government's need to keep information in confi-
dence. 162 A refutable presumption of confidentiality for criminal in-
vestigative sources would be a proper balance for several reasons.
First, a refutable presumption would be fair to the requester
and would preserve FOIA's purpose of allowing public scrutiny. As
the Landano Court recognized, fairness mandates that the requester
receive some information to avoid what would otherwise be an irref-
utable presumption negating FOIA's purpose of public scrutiny. 163
However, to supply the requester with the information needed to
contend the presumption may negate the exemption, for the pur-
pose of the exemption is to prevent the disclosure ofjust that sort of
information. If the circumstances surrounding the interview would
not reasonably expose the identity of the source, then the Govern-
ment should be required as a matter of pre-adjudicative procedure
to divulge these circumstances to the requester. 164 If this is a point
of contention, then a judicial in camera review could allow for a dis-
interested party experienced in making such judgments to deter-
mine whether or not that information can be divulged. This balance
would establish a refutable presumption, which would both be fair
158 Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1486.
159 See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text.
160 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
161 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
163 United States Dep't ofJustice v. Landano, 113 S. Ct. 2014, 2022 (1993); see supra
notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
164 Note that this requirement is consistent with the presumption that a FBI source is
confidential. A presumption would simply denote a particular bias the court should
take. Divulging this information would be a matter of procedure, and may provide the
requester with the necessary information to overcome the presumption. Thus when this
Note contends that Congress should amend FOIA and grant the FBI a presumption of
confidentiality, there is no internal tension between that and recognizing the need for
fairness to the requester because the presumption would be refutable. See infra part VI.
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to the requester (by providing the opportunity to meaningfully con-
tend it) and maintain the public's right to scrutinize the
Government.
As the Landano Court recognized, a presumption would in-
crease the ability of the FBI to elicit information that is necessary for
productive law enforcement.165 First, often sources have nothing to
gain by cooperating with the FBI (except possibly peace of mind),
and even a small chance of negative publicity may be enough to de-
ter them from cooperating. Second, the FBI typically investigates
serious offenses.' 6 6 Consequently, subjects of investigations are
more likely to be in a position to seek reprisals. A presumption of
confidentiality may help alleviate these concerns. Moreover, most
sources assume, and rely on their assumption, that their coopera-
tion is confidential; even mentioning one's name in connection with
an FBI investigation often creates a stigma and could subject one to
unnecessary public attention and harassment.16 7 Finally, since Ex-
emption 7(D) attempts to protect the sources, 68 it should be up to
the sources, not the government, to decide whether or not to reveal
their identity 169
The Court in Landano distinguished between individual and in-
stitutional sources and found that it was not reasonable to infer an
implied understanding of confidentiality in all cases.170 However, if
it is reasonable to imply confidentiality in most cases, the existence
of a couple of exemptions is no reason to reject a presumption-
especially if it would further the purpose of law enforcement with-
out compromising the purpose of public scrutiny or fairness to the
requester.
The majority of individual sources expect their cooperation to
be confidential.'17 First, as Landano grants, informants should be
165 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2024 (finding that the presumption would undoubtedly
serve the Government's law enforcement objective).
166 But see id. at 2021 (finding that the presumption should not apply because the FBI
investigates various activities).
167 Nadler v. United States Dep't of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1992);
Johnson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1518 (10th Cir. 1984).
168 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
169 See Ingle v. Dep't ofJustice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that, even if
the source was not subject to intrusion or harassment, "it seems clear that it is properly
the right of those sources themselves to waive any protection afforded by cooperating
with the FBI and 'not the role of the FBI to suffer them to do so'") (citing Conoco Inc.
v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982); see also Miller v. Bell,
661 F.2d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the sources may waive their right to
confidentiality, but it is not the role of the FBI to do so regardless of the possibly benefi-
cial purpose).
170 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2021-22.
171 See Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1518 (finding that most sources assume the information
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confidential sources. It is clear that they are crucial to law enforce-
ment and likely to be deterred from cooperating if their identity is
disclosed. Second, individual witnesses should be confidential
sources. As noted previously, there is a stigma simply in being asso-
ciated with the FBI during a criminal investigation. This stigma may
well subject the individual to unwanted attention or harassment. 172
If for some reason sources desire the attention, then certainly they
could waive their confidential status. But this decision should be
made by the source, not the Government.' 73
The Court in Landano rejected the Government's contention
that individual sources should be presumed confidential because the
risk of reprisals or other negative attention is inherent in criminal
investigations. 174 The Court found that in any given case reprisals
may not be threatened.1 75 However, this finding does not deny that
in any given case reprisals may indeed be threatened. 176 Given the
types of individuals the FBI investigates and the stigma associated
with the Bureau, reprisals seem more likely than not. These rea-
sons support a presumption of confidentiality for individual sources,
unless the requester can illustrate that such an inference would be
unreasonable. Thus, a refutable presumption again appears to be a
proper balance.
The majority of institutional sources expect their cooperation
to be confidential as well. 177 First, private institutions should be
deemed confidential sources. They are subject to the same stigma
and possible unwanted attention as individual sources. 178 Although
they may be able to take the publicity and turn it into a marketing
tool, negative publicity could damage their business. In addition,
they may even be subject to possible legal action. 179 The Court
merely asserted that these contentions were conclusory and that,
they give will be kept confidential); Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1486 (finding that most sources
expect their contact to be held in confidence); see also Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2021 (recog-
nizing that most people may expect confidentiality).
172 See Nadler, 955 F.2d at 1486.
173 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2021.
175 See id.
176 It is important to note that reprisals are not limited to physical threats (such as a
gang member getting revenge on an informant), but include economic threats (such as a
store owner losing business because he was involved with the FBI), as well as harass-
ment or unwanted attention (such as from curious neighbors) that may dissuade a
source from cooperating because they get nothing in return.
177 Keyes v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding
that "law enforcement authorities and other institutional sources would likewise have
expected the information they provided to be kept in the strictest confidence").
178 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
179 See Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022.
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given the variety of information received, it was not reasonable to
infer confidentiality in all cases.' 80 The Court did not contend,
however, that it would be unreasonable in a significant number of
cases; and, as with the individual sources, it should be the institu-
tion's decision whether or not to waive their confidential status.' 8 '
Furthermore, if a refutable presumption was established, then in
those cases where it is unreasonable to infer confidentiality, the pre-
sumption would simply be rebutted.
Second, public agencies should be deemed confidential
sources. The Court found no basis for the argument "that disclo-
sure ordinarily would affect cooperating agencies adversely or that
the agencies otherwise would be deterred from providing even the
most non sensitive information."'18 2 However, the exchange of
crime-related information among law enforcement agencies often
depends on an implicit promise of confidentiality. 8 3 Cooperation
between agencies can be an integral part of law enforcement. To
summarily open such cooperation to public scrutiny may inhibit
frank discussion and impair the quality of decisions.'8 4 This seems
needlessly to constrain the officers needlessly. A presumption could
lessen that constraint.
Essentially, a refutable presumption is consistent with the two
competing purposes of FOIA and Exemption 7(D). First, it would
serve FOIA's goal of public scrutiny because it allows the public the
opportunity to contest the presumption meaningfully. Second, it
would serve 7(D)'s goal by facilitating the law enforcement's ability
to obtain information. As the Eleventh Circuit stated, "it is beyond
dispute that an increased fear of exposure would chill the public's
willingness to cooperate with the FBI in the course of criminal in-
vestigations."' 85 This fact applies to both individual and institu-
tional sources. Thus, a refutable presumption would fulfill
Congress' purpose of achieving a proper balance.' 8 6
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note examined the legislative and legal background of Ex-
180 Id
181 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
182 Landano, 113 S. Ct. at 2022.
183 Keyes v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 830 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
184 See DowJones & Co. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 917 F.2d 571, 575 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (quoting Ryan v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 617 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980))
(applying the same rationale to communications between Congress and the Executive
Branch).
185 Nadler v. United States Dep't of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1486 (11 th Cir. 1992).
186 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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emption 7(D) as well as the Government's evidentiary burden of in-
voking 7(D). After discussing the background and decision in
Landano, this Note contended that the statutory construction of
FOIA prevents a presumption of confidentiality for FBI sources that
cooperated during a criminal investigation. Critiquing the Court's
holding in Landano, the Note found that it correctly rejected the pre-
sumption, and focused the inquiry for future courts in deciding
whether or not a source is confidential. Once fairness to the re-
quester was considered and safeguards were in place to prevent a
presumption from becoming irrefutable, this Note found that a re-
futable presumption would facilitate the Government's law enforce-
ment objective. Additionally, it would protect the purpose of public
scrutiny inherent in FOIA. Consequently, Congress should amend
Exemption 7(D) to place the burden of proof on the requester but,
as a matter of pre-adjudicative procedure, require the agency to di-
vulge information such as the nature of the crime and the source's
relation to it. This would afford the requester with the opportunity
to rebut the presumption and serve the competing interests.
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